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Does the new setup work?




To improve the ability of the European Commission to tackle the challenges faced by the European Union (EU),
President Jean-Claude Juncker introduced organisational innovations at the start of his mandate in 2014: a new
Commission structure, one organised in a more hierarchical way, followed later by a number of other innovations,
such as new working methods for the 'Brussels executive'. They were meant to break down the silos within the
Commission, allow for increased interaction between Commissioners and streamline the work of the institution.
Apart from the President, the Commission's new structure has at the top seven Vice-Presidents (VPs), who are
responsible for major cross-cutting policy fields. The Vice-Presidents, including the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy (HR/VP), were entrusted with an enhanced leadership role and the
responsibility to coordinate a project team of Commissioners with relevant portfolios.
President Juncker also announced that his Commission would be more political. It would move away from its
technocratic image and become more proactive, opinionated and assertive. Commissioners would be asked to
participate in public debates more often, both at the European level and in their countries of origin.
With the Juncker Commission more than halfway through its mandate, it is time to take stock of the ways in
which the introduced innovations have changed the way the Brussels executive works. While the Juncker
Commission has also set a political agenda based on ten priorities, this Discussion Paper focuses on the
institutional innovations. As a result of the changes introduced, the European Commission has been transformed
into an institution that is now more openly making political choices, though the change is far from being
complete and some flaws are still evident.
The innovations introduced by the Juncker Commission have generally increased its ability to prioritise and
improved the quality and coherence of its work. Dividing responsibilities among Vice-Presidents and 'regular'
Commissioners has allowed for a more efficient delegation of tasks, and the Commission has managed to act in
a more coherent fashion. The current setup, with more powerful Vice-Presidents, also streamlined and brought
more focus to the executive.
At the same time, there are still many internal challenges. The higher level of centralisation in the institution
added challenges regarding internal coordination, transparency and speed of the decisions taken, contributing
to a sense of disillusionment among the staff. The new role of the Vice-Presidents has not always been clear,
which has affected the efficiency of the institution. From this perspective, the new structure introduced by the
2Juncker Commission is likely to be a transitional one. To address the staff's demoralisation within the
Commission,the communication between the upper ranks of the Commission and the services needs to
improve. The latter need to be engaged and used in the matters in which they are specialised.
The future Commission President should also focus on achieving a better distribution of portfolios,
according to their weight and even distribution. A better allocation of portfolios should also be
accompanied by a better distribution of human resources across the cabinets, and within the Commission
services more generally.
In recent years, the member states have also been exerting greater influence on the EU institutional setup,
including inside the Commission. Although the Juncker Commission is active in the defence of its interest
when interacting with the other EU institutions and the member states, there is room for further
improvement, so that the Commission does not become a mere secretariat for the member states. 
Finally, the political character of future Commissions will depend on the continued link with the outcome of
the European elections, established in 2014 through the Spitzenkandidaten process. Abandoning this
connection would send the wrong message to European citizens regarding the legitimacy of the European
Commission. While the political character of the Commission has been reinforced, the more technocratic
and regulatory missions of the Commission, such as the enforcement of EU competition rules, have become
even more evident and there is a need to make a clearer separation between the two roles. 
Introduction
In September 2014, then President-elect of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker put forward his
priorities and proposals for the portfolios of Commissioners, and presented a new Commission structure
organised in a more hierarchical way, as well as several other innovations. The innovations introduced were
meant to break down the policy silos within the Commission, allow for increased interaction between
Commissioners and streamline the work of the executive. 
With the Juncker Commission more than halfway through its mandate, this Discussion Paper looks at how
the introduced changes impacted the way the 'Brussels executive' works. While the Juncker Commission
has set a political agenda based on ten priorities, this paper will rather focus on the institutional innovations,
by drawing on multiple data sources including individual semi-structured interviews conducted in the
European institutions between September 2016 and May 2017, official documents, newspaper articles and
secondary literature. What is the exact role of the Vice-Presidents? How influential are they? Have the
innovations affected collegiality? Do the project teams work? Have they made the Commission more
efficient? Has the Commission become more political, and if so, what are the implications of this
development? Does this mean the Commission has been politicised? How have the Commission's relations
with the member states and the European Parliament evolved? What are the are the lessons learned and
what should be done in the future?
The Juncker Commission, as the two Barroso Commissions preceding it (2004-2014), had to deal with the
consequences of the 'one country, one commissioner' principle1 which, after successive rounds of
enlargement, has led to a higher number of Commissioners in the College relative to the number of weighty
portfolios. The high number of Commissioners made a meaningful distribution of portfolios difficult and
created challenges regarding the operability of the College, made decision-making more complex and
facilitated the fragmentation and 'siloisation' of Commission services.
To address these challenges, different proposals were put forward for a more hierarchical structure of the
Commission compared to the Barroso Commission.2 Similar proposals resurfaced before the start of the term
of the Juncker Commission in 2014.3 President Juncker and his team drew inspiration from them and
structured the new College in a more hierarchical manner.
A political Commission
To break down policy silos and improve policy coherence and the Commission's output, President Juncker
introduced a new structure of the executive and sought to raise its political profile. Apart from the President,
the new structure has at its top seven Vice-Presidents (VPs), including the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Policy and Security Policy (HR/VP), chosen for their political weight and origin. According to
President Juncker the Commission's composition, with VPs responsible for major cross-cutting policy fields4
(see Figure 1 below), "shows that it will be more political than its predecessors".5 In a decisive moment for
the state and future of the Union, President Juncker's political Commission was meant to move away from
its technocratic image, becoming more pro-active, opinionated and assertive, with Commissioners
participating in public debates more often, both at the European level and in their countries of origin.
The Commission President held that "the Commission is not just a troop of anonymous high officials" and
that "the directors-general, […], have to obey their Commissioners and not the other way around" and on
another occasion, he added that "the Commission has to take responsibility by being political, and not
technocratic". As part of the political character of the Commission, President Juncker also emphasised an
increased reflection of the wishes of the European Parliament and the member states, which led it to
withdraw a hundred proposals in the first two years of its mandate, present 80% fewer initiatives than during
the previous five years, and to request the review of all existing legislation, to focus on "where Europe can
provide real added value".6 President Juncker also stated he wants to maintain the more political character
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of the institution by, among other things, abolishing the electoral leave and allowing Commissioners to
participate in the next European elections without having to suspend themselves from the Commission.
The project teams
The more political nature of the Juncker Commission was also reflected in the choice of Commissioners.
Like the Commission President, several of the Vice-Presidents (Jyrki Katainen, Valdis Dombrovskis, Andrus
Ansip) had been prime-ministers in their home countries, while others (Kristalina Georgieva, Maros
Sefcovic) had been Commissioners in the Barroso Commission, or foreign ministers (Frans Timmermans,
Federica Mogherini). The Vice-Presidents have an enhanced role and each of them is leading and
coordinating a project team of Commissioners with portfolios relevant to their team. There are seven project
teams, which deal with Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness; Digital Single Market; Energy
Union; Euro and Social Dialogue; Better Regulation and Interinstitutional Relations; Budget and Human
Resources; Europe in the World.
Figure 1. The Juncker Commission College of commissioners
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Name Portfolio State Party7
Jean-Claude Juncker President Luxembourg EPP
Frans Timmermans First Vice-President, Better Regulation, Inter-
Institutional Relations, Rule of Law and Charter of Netherlands PES
Fundamental Rights
Federica Mogherini Vice-President, Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Italy PES
Kristalina Georgieva Vice-President, Budget and Human Resources Bulgaria EPP
(until Dec. 2016)
Maros Sefcovic Vice-President, Energy Union Slovakia PES
Jyrki Katainen Vice-President, Jobs, Growth, Investment and Finland EPP
Competitiveness
Valdis Dombrovskis Vice-President, Euro and Social Dialogue and 
Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Latvia EPP
Markets Union
Andrus Ansip Vice-President, Digital Single Market Estonia ALDE
Vera Jourová Justice and Consumers Czechia ALDE
Günther Oettinger Budget and Human Resources Germany EPP
Pierre Moscovici Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and France PES
Customs
Marianne Thyssen Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility Belgium EPP
Corina Cretu Regional Policy Romania PES
Johannes Hahn European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Austria EPP
Negotiations
Mariya Gabriel Digital Economy and Society Bulgaria EPP
(from July 2017)
Dimitris Avramopoulos Migration and Citizenship Greece EPP
Vytenis Andriukaitis Health and Food Safety Lithuania PES
The project teams were set up with the aim of improving policy coherence and efficiency by breaking down
the policy silos and overcoming the stove-piped organisation of the Commission, which previously posed
challenges in terms of coordination. The composition of the teams varies according to the topic, which
means that Commissioners belong to more than one project team and need to coordinate with more than
one Vice-President. The Vice-Presidents also act as gate-keepers. They have a veto right over proposals
coming from the Commissioners that belong to their teams, even before they reach the First Vice-President,
former Dutch Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans. 
The latter occupies a special place among the Vice-Presidents. He is responsible for Better Regulation, 
Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must guarantee that
Commission proposals respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The First Vice-President
must check that what is brought to the political level is political and has an important role in deciding what
is included in the Commission's Annual Work Programme and the College agendas, which is part of what
makes the Juncker Commission more political.
The Commission describes its new structure as being part of the ethos of Better regulation, thus also
signalling an attempt to foster a cultural change within the institution. This is meant to make the
Commission's decision-making more transparent, increase the involvement of citizens and stakeholders
throughout the policymaking process, base the executive's actions on a better understanding of their impact
and to reduce burdens on citizens and businesses.
The ten priorities
While the Barroso Commissions' priorities were sometimes considered blurred and too wide, President
Juncker signalled a move away from micro-managing and proposed a more focused and more political
approach based on ten priorities8 (see figure 2 below). Several interviewees9 have argued that the intensity
of work on the priorities varies, depending on the changing realities. However, the fact that the priorities
have not changed since 2014 opens them to criticism of not adapting to new realities (for example, a
balanced EU-US Free Trade Agreement is still one of the priorities, despite the negotiations having stalled
under the current US administration). 
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Julian King Security Union United Kingdom none
(from Sept. 2016)
Elzbieta Bienkowska Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs Poland EPP
Miguel Arias Cañete Climate Action and Energy Spain EPP
Neven Mimica International Cooperation and Development Croatia PES
Margrethe Vestager Competition Denmark ALDE
Violeta Bulc Transport Slovenia ALDE
Cecilia Malmström Trade Sweden ALDE
Karmenu Vella Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Malta PES
Tibor Navracsics Education, Culture, Youth and Sport Hungary EPP
Carlos Moedas Research, Science and Innovation Portugal EPP
Phil Hogan Agriculture and Rural Development Ireland EPP
Christos Stylianides Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Cyprus EPP
Jonathan Hill Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital United Kingdom AECR
(until July 2016) Markets Union
Figure 2. The ten priorities of the Juncker Commission
The working methods
To improve the efficiency of the Commission's work and, in view of the changes brought about by the new
structure, to avoid duplication of efforts, new working methods were introduced. The document 'The
Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-201910 updates the previous one11 mainly with
provisions regarding the new role of the Vice-Presidents, and gives a good explanation of how the institution
is supposed to work. As a rule, new initiatives are not included in the Commission Work Programme, nor
placed on the agenda of the College unless this is recommended by one of the Vice-Presidents, with
arguments that are in line with the October 2014 Political Guidelines and in line with the General Priorities.
All initiatives tend to be structured along the ten priorities put forward by Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014. In
the past, Commission staff could work on initiatives on which they wanted to focus, in an open-ended
process wherein the first sign of potential trouble only appeared when a proposal went into inter-service
consultations. The open-ended nature of the process also facilitated the leaking of drafts, which sometimes
negatively affected the process. Now, the Vice-Presidents steer the work of the Commission and need to
validate the process early on.
During the Barroso Commission, the work was mostly done in bilateral structures, not in thematic groups,
as there was no special meeting among the Vice-Presidents. Now that there are project teams, a more
collective approach is used in the early stages. Proposals are discussed and evaluated in orientation 
debates or project group meetings. This means that the political level of the Commission is involved in the
decision-making process at an earlier stage, and thus has a bigger influence in shaping policy. However,
this also has its downsides because many of these meetings do not benefit from a solid input from the
services that could provide the necessary background to inform the discussion.12
In addition, aside from the weekly 'Jour Fixe' meeting between a Commissioner and the senior management
of the services that report to him/her, the Juncker Commission introduced strategic 'Jour Fixe' meetings, which
cover strategic, political and interinstitutional questions and are organised at least once every two months
between a Commissioner, the senior management of the services that report to him/her and the relevant 
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1. Jobs, growth and investment
Stimulating investment for the purpose of job creation
2. Digital single market
Bringing down barriers to unlock online opportunities
3. Energy union and climate
Making energy more secure, affordable and sustainable
4. Internal market
A deeper and fairer internal market
5. A deeper and fairer economic and monetary union
Stability for the single currency, solidity of public finances and social fairness in implementing 
structural reforms
6. A balanced EU-US free trade agreement
Freer trade – without sacrificing Europe's standards
7. Justice and fundamental rights
Upholding the rule of law and linking up Europe's justice systems
8. Migration
Towards a European agenda on migration
9. A stronger global actor
Bringing together the tools of Europe's external action
10. Democratic change
Making the EU more democratic
Vice-President. There is also a clearer differentiation between the various roles of the Commissioners, so that,
for example, on technical, economic issues, the other Commissioners can only challenge an issue if they
have strong data contradicting the proposals made by their colleagues.
The Agenda Planning software, renamed 'Decide Planning', is used by the Commission to manage new
initiatives and partially replaces 'e-Greffe', the old system for managing the decision-making procedures.
The new platform was previously used for monitoring initiatives and statistical purposes, but now it also has
a control function. An initiative that is put into the system needs to be validated by the cabinet of the
respective Commissioners before arriving at the Commission's Secretariat-General (SecGen), where it is
screened and comments can be added. A unit within the Secretariat-General decides which initiatives 
are major (legislative initiatives, policy documents – communications, green/white papers – evaluations of
Commission initiatives, sensitive/political important matters) and need to be validated by the 
Vice-Presidents. The Vice-Presidents can approve the initiative, reject it or send it back for revision. In case
of rejection, the Vice-President is expected to explain the reasons for the rejection. The initiative is then sent
to the First Vice-President who can overrule previous decisions.
According to the current rules, the Directorates-General (DGs) of the Commission cannot start working on
an initiative without formal validation from their Commissioner and Vice-President. Thus, the Vice-Presidents
provide the political validation of Commission initiatives, and must give their agreement and political input
both at the beginning of the process, before Commission resources are allocated to work on an issue, and at
the end, after a proposal has been put forward. Consequently, the current rules of procedure allow for more
moments to say 'no', with one higher official stating that "the default position of this Commission is 'no', the
default position of the previous Commission was 'yes'"13, and that the Commission is "effective when it comes
to stopping things". However, it appears that the veto power of the VPs is not used very often. Less than fifty
cases have been registered in more than two years. Some interviewees noted that, although the idea to
control the process in this way is a good one, the cabinets are still reluctant to use this power.14 Several of
the refusals were in fact requests for proposals to be improved, but it also happened that two Commission
DGs came up with the same proposal or even that the same initiative came from different parts of the same
DG (Environment).
The Vice-Presidents and the first VP
The first years of the Juncker Commission mandate have not been without hiccups and the new structure
has not solved all the past problems related to, for example, the insufficient and unequally distributed
weight and unequal distribution of some of the portfolios. It is also evident that an adjustment period was
needed in the first year of activity, as the Vice-Presidents and Commissioners settled in and tried to define
their roles, which has occasionally led to friction in the College.
The collegiality of the Commission has also been reworked. While President Juncker has stated that all
Commissioners were equal – not least since they each maintain a vote within the College – there is a visible
change in the role of the Vice-Presidents, from a more ceremonial one in the Barroso Commission to a more
powerful one now. While the influence of the Vice-Presidents is limited by several factors, the structure of
the Juncker Commission has created somehow clearer hierarchies within the College. The project teams are
led by the Vice-Presidents and ultimately by the President and his cabinet.
It appears that the main reason why President Barroso did not propose a more hierarchical College back 
in 2004 was his wish to give a clear political signal that all Commissioners were equal in this first College
after the 'Big Bang' enlargement, even if that was difficult to achieve in practice. Five years later in 2009,
when the second Barroso Commission was put in place, the need to absorb the institutional changes
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty has been the main reason to maintain the more horizontal organisation
of the College. But the introduction of project groups was not new. The Barroso Commission had groups 
of Commissioners working on related policies, or Commissioners who had coordinating roles (for 
example, Vice-President Wallström oversaw Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy while
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8Viviane Reding was responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship). The groups of
Commissioners working on the multiannual financial framework (MFF), the fundamental rights group 
of Commissioners, and the Group of External Relations Commissioners (the RELEX Group) were some of 
the best known, though their role was limited. For example, the RELEX Group of Commissioners met only
a few times, the High Representative/Vice-President Catherine Ashton, the regular chair of the meetings, 
being at times sidelined by the President of the Commission, who was chairing the RELEX Group meetings
he was attending. That experience has been reflected in the current setup and the innovations introduced
by the Juncker Commission appear to be, in part, a continuation and improvement of ideas tested in
previous colleges. 
The current setup with more powerful Vice-Presidents was also meant to streamline and bring more focus
to the Commission, also adding a stronger steer from above. This marks an improvement over the previous
system, under which work on the various crises affecting the EU, most notably the financial and sovereign
debt crisis, fell under the responsibility of the cabinet of President Barroso, which was left with little time
and resources to continue its work on other projects initiated by the Commission (such as sustainable
development, energy and the like).
However, the influence of the Vice-Presidents within the Juncker Commission is mitigated by several factors. 
First and foremost, their roles have not been clearly defined and most of them do not have direct access to
the Commission services15 but need to work through the Secretariat-General of the Commission and in
consultation with the relevant Commissioner and the President's cabinet. This is done to avoid duplication
of work and improve coordination and communication between the cabinets. In the previous Commissions,
the Vice-Presidents had more direct access and responsibility over their respective Directorates-General or
parts of DGs. 
The clarity regarding one's role and mandate, and the influence that is associated with it also varies among
the different portfolios. Among the Vice-Presidents, some of the positions, such as the one of the 
High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (HR-VP), are not new and have somehow more 
clearly defined mandates. In the Juncker Commission, the HR-VP is better integrated in the Commission
structures than her predecessor, while it leads and relies on support mainly from the European External
Action Service (EEAS), an EU body which cooperates with the Commission, but remains outside of 
its structures. Some Commissioners, such as the ones for Competition or Trade, areas where the 
Commission has exclusive competences, also have clearer and more prominent roles than even some of 
the Vice-Presidents. 
The lack of a well-established and clearly defined role proved to be a challenge for some of the former
prime ministers in the College who were used to having clearer roles in their national administrations. The
fact that Vice-Presidents sometimes struggle to get the support they want as they do not have direct access
to the services of the Commission, which are in most cases smaller than the national bureaucracies they
used to lead, has also been a source of frustration and a challenge to a clearer definition of these positions.
The Commission's decision to consciously reduce the number of new initiatives, and thus the opportunities
for political visibility, has had a similar effect.
Another mitigating element is the fact that President Juncker has shown to be supportive of 'regular'
Commissioners as well, not only of the Vice-Presidents. In some cases, this has gone as far as having VPs
complaining that they have been excluded from certain processes and that decisions were taken without
them being involved early enough. 
Third, as with past Colleges, there are differences in the VPs/Commissioners' professional skills and levels
of experience, with some of them receiving more criticism than others. The negative aspects of this are
partially compensated by the Juncker Commission's stronger focus on the President's cabinet, which keeps
a tighter grip on the institution.
9The fact that several Commissioners from big member states are coordinated by Vice-Presidents from smaller
countries, a potentially politically sensitive issue, seems not to have been a problem. The distribution of
portfolios and roles within the Commission was accepted by the member states with relative ease. 
How well Commissioners cooperate among each other varies from one project team to another for a variety
of reasons. The success of a project team depends on the scope of the areas covered. Many teams are too big
and too dispersed, which makes coordination more difficult. For example, the Jobs, Growth, Investment and
Competitiveness team has 16 members, besides the Vice-President in charge, while the Better Regulation and
Interinstitutional Relations team has 19 members.
Apart from institutional constraints, the functioning of the teams is also influenced by the quality of the
relations between the Vice-Presidents and regular Commissioners, which also depends on their individual
personalities and personal relations. One of the cases most often mentioned where tensions occurred in the
first months of the Juncker Commission is the energy team, where two commissioners with different political
affiliations needed time to accommodate their relations and partial duplication of roles. Frictions have also
occasionally arisen when a VP/Commissioner was seemingly encroaching upon the area of responsibility of
another Commissioner, such as when the Vice-President for the Euro and Social Dialogue became active on
the issue of EU-Ukraine relations, a topic (mainly) under the remit of the Commissioner in charge of European
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
In addition to the lack of a clear definition of the roles of the Vice-Presidents, the Juncker College also displays
a certain imbalance regarding the weight of the portfolios. The partial duplication of roles in the energy team
has already been mentioned. An example of a 'lighter' Vice-President portfolio was the one for Digital Single
Market, held by Andrus Ansip, whose role resembled that of Günther Oettinger, the Commissioner in charge
of Digital Economy and Society. However, when Commissioner Oettinger took over the Budget and Human
Resources portfolio in January 2017, his previous digital economy portfolio was added to the portfolio of Ansip. 
At the other end of the scale, the First Vice-President's cabinet has a heavy set of responsibilities. Interviews
revealed the substantial amount of issues that arrive on the table of the First Vice-President. Aside from
overseeing Better regulation, Inter-institutional relations, the Rule of law and the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, the First Vice-President has also taken on difficult dossiers such as the Turkey deal on migration and the
rule of law situation in Poland, an overburden of tasks which sometimes affected the speed and quality of the
decisions taken.16 While the First Vice-President had the full backing of the College on the rule-of-law situation
in Poland, he received more criticism when it came to the migrants' crisis, including from the external relations
cabinets, which did not appreciate the Commission leadership's attempt to make migration the main issue
defining the EU's relations with its neighbours. Despite the high quantity of work, the cabinet of the First 
Vice-President has only one extra staff member than the cabinets of the other Vice-Presidents. 
The risk of politicisation
President Juncker announced a more political Commission, one that must play an active political role while
the EU is steering through difficult waters. One of the challenges of having a more political Commission is the
increased risk of politicisation, of emphasising the ideological differences among the members of the College.
Polarisation along lines of political orientation and ideological biases would affect the work of the College and
its ability to take decisions. The EU executive would also be less likely to find compromises among and enjoy
the trust of the different EU member states, which are governed by different political forces. 
The composition of the Juncker College in terms of political affiliation takes into account the results of the
European elections and of the political realities in the member states, while achieving a certain balance with
a mix of politicians from the centre-right (15), centre-left (8) and liberals (5). Given that the President of the
Commission comes from the centre-right, the centre-left politician Frans Timmermans was chosen to be the
First Vice-President of the executive. While the First Vice-President and the President are supposed to have a
good working relationship, the former being the 'right hand of the President', sometimes the two pull in
different directions.
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Commissioners remain politically involved to varying degrees. They have coordination meetings with their
colleagues from the same political family (there are, for example, weekly meetings of Socialist
Commissioners) and ad-hoc meetings with representatives of their European political parties. While there
have been instances where the political diversity of the Commission was evident, including in what
concerns the communication of specific policy outputs (for example, liberal Commissioners pushed for a
substantial communication of the Services Package, while Socialist Commissioners emphasised other topics
related to it), most often the issue has not gained prominence. 
Many of the differences of opinion among Commissioners stem from the portfolios they are managing (for
example, differences on environment issues between the Commissioner for Environment and the one for
Internal Market and Industry), rather than from ideological differences. Moreover, the Political Guidelines
of the Commission, the 'governing programme' of the Commission, are generally based on a trans-partisan
European common ground.17
Increased demoralisation
While there is rather wide agreement that the Commission has become a better streamlined and more
focused institution, important challenges remain to be addressed. Several of the interviewees spoke about
disillusionment and demoralisation within the European Commission. This appears to be caused both by
external factors having to do with the state of the European project but also by internal considerations,
linked to the functioning of the European institutions and the Commission in particular. 
The critical 'state of the Union'
The number of crises facing the EU in recent years, from the financial crisis, the euro area crisis, Brexit 
to the refugee crisis, and the decrease in popular support for the EU, have surprised and demoralised many
Commission fonctionnaires. The Commission also suffers from the anti-establishment mood that has 
spread among European societies. Moreover, in the past, the EU's big projects, such as the euro or the 'Big 
Bang enlargement', helped create a clearer sense of purpose in the European institutions. This seems to 
be missing now, contributing to a reduced sense of confidence in the European project among the staff of
the Commission.
Internal factors
To these external factors, internal ones can be added. The start of the mandate of the Juncker College
distressed many staff members in the Commission, who were told that the Commission would do less, not
more. They felt undervalued, as if the new College thought of them as a "stubborn, insensitive
bureaucracy".18 The perception among parts of the Commission is that several of the Commissioners,
including its President, who were top-level leaders in their member states, were more likely to believe that
the Commission was doing too many things; now, the argument goes, these politicians have the control and
push the European Commission to do less.
i. Centralisation
The centralisation of decision-making and the widening distance between the top leadership of the
Commission and its services were also mentioned by several interviewees19 as contributing to a sense of
demoralisation among the staff of the Commission. This more political Commission has witnessed a
centralisation of the decision-making process, with work often being done "in small political teams rather
than drawing in the services".20 This is sustained by the more hierarchical structure chosen in 2014, which
gives more decision power to the upper echelons of the Commission, by the strengthening of the cabinet
of the President but has also been required by the numerous challenges facing the EU and the Commission.
The reinforcement of the SecGen, already started under President Barroso during the mandate of the
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previous Secretary-General, Catherine Day, also contributed to the centralisation of the decision-making
process in the Berlaymont building. This process involved the creation of thematic policy units and the
addition of 80 new posts to support the Vice-Presidents, which allow the College to use the SecGen in ways
not possible before. Consequently, proposals increasingly tend to come not from the DGs but out of smaller
meetings, whether the weekly Hebdo meetings of the heads of cabinet, where the head of the President's
cabinet is very active, the Secretariat-General, or the cabinets of the Commissioners. This is visible
especially when the matter is urgent and/or high profile, in which situations the work is done in the
Secretariat-General or the cabinets and not in the DGs, which leads to faster responses but sometimes it can
also impact the quality of the output.21
The centralisation is further emphasised by the increased influence of President Juncker's cabinet, currently
led by Martin Selmayr. A capable and influential head of cabinet, he is seen as showing the sort of strong
control exercised in the Barroso Commission by Catherine Day. While there seems to be agreement that 
this is being done in agreement with President Juncker, the "Rasputin of the house"22 also provokes
accusations of "arrogance", "ruthlessness", of "not generating spontaneous solidarity but servility", and of
"leaving a trail of animosity" behind him.23 The irritation is sometimes visible even within the College, with
some officials believing that the interference from the President's cabinet goes too far, for example when it
comes to limiting the access of the Commissioners to the President. While the stronger cabinet of the
President has moved the Commission out of its comfort zones, it has also streamlined decisions and
improved policy coherence.
There is also criticism regarding the concentration of power by the President. Some think he lacks the
necessary gravitas required by the position, as shown for example in some of his interactions with UKIP
leader Nigel Farage24, or accuse him of postponing decisions in areas where he does not hold an interest in,
as was the case with the Nature Directives.25 The President is also criticised for showing a strong political-
cultural bias that makes him too easily influenced by the interests of Germany and, to a lesser extent, France,
even though he has also at times frustrated Berlin and Paris. Defenders of the centralisation, however, argue
convincingly that for the Commission to become more of a political actor, it was necessary to show and
strengthen leadership, to streamline the decision-making process and to further centralise the institution. 
ii. Lack of transparency and efficiency
Centralising decision-making has also created challenges regarding coordination and information flows,
with one high-level Commission official going as far as stating that "nothing that matters is done
transparently".26 Given that the system is geared towards the top, there are now less people in the know.
Other Commission officials report that they spend more time on internal coordination, and information
flows do not run smoothly, with some procedures still lacking. In the cabinets of Commissioners there is
also discontent regarding large documents only arriving the evening prior to the day when they need to be
approved, which affects the quality of the process and the results. Even the input of the cabinets seems to
be sometimes put into question. A telling example is the Energy Union Package, a sizable part of which was
reportedly written by the Secretariat-General, even though it falls under the remit of Vice-President Sefcovic
and of Commissioner Cañete.27
The new rules of procedure, which have introduced several veto points, have also partially slowed down
the process. After one year of using the new system, the Commission realised that there was a need to
improve the speed of the procedure as it found out that there were delays on 25% of its initiatives, with
some of them being stuck in a political discussion while others were inactive. Apart from the increased
complexity of the process, one of the reasons of the mentioned delays28 is the fact that there are no explicit
deadlines for the cabinets of the Commissioners to respond to initiatives coming from the services. The
Secretariat-General has deadlines (72 hours for the desk officers, 24 hours for the hierarchy) but the cabinets
of Commissioners do not, with the platform lacking a way to signal what is the reason for the delay, and
whether the proposal is under consideration or not.
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Communications
The Juncker Commission also reviewed and further centralised the communication structures of the
Commission. Although the Commissioners maintain a communication adviser in their cabinets, they do not
have a spokesperson anymore and must rely on the Commission's Spokesperson's Service, which has been
centralised and is reporting to the Director-General of DG Communication. Besides the need to improve and
better control communication, the official reason for this reduction of spokespeople talking for/on behalf of the
Commission is the reduction in the number of new initiatives put forward by the Commission. If the
Commission does less29, there are also fewer issues to communicate, the argument goes. While this has made
communication more consistent and has reduced the cacophony of different voices speaking in the name of
the Commission, it has also limited the ability of the institution to communicate its activities and has reduced
the number of contact points for external stakeholders to talk to, thus making engagement with the Commission
more bureaucratic and less direct and interactive. The Commission aims to communicate in Brussels only one
or two stories per day. This has made its communication even more Brussels-centric as, for example, topics of
interest for national communities are avoided because it is expected that the Brussels media would not be
interested in them.30
At the same time, being a more political institution also involves a degree of volatility and an increased attention
to what the media say, with president Juncker, a long serving politician, being quite prone to this.31 The issue was
evident, for example, in the November 2016 roaming package blunder, when the Commission President asked
the services to withdraw the roaming proposal they put forward because of the criticism it received. 
Relations with the member states and the European Parliament
The last years have seen an increased role and political influence of the member states. The growing influence
of national capitals is felt within the EU's overall institutional setup but also inside the Commission, with one
senior Commission official mentioning that "we are just listening to the calls from Paris or Berlin" and that 
"the College moves as the (member states) pendulum moves".32 In the short term, it makes it easier for workable
solutions to be found, but in the long term it can lead to a loss of influence for the Commission and it can 
affect its role of promoter of the general interest of the EU. Some national capitals, on the other hand, are
critical of the Juncker Commission as they feel that the institution is not taking their concerns seriously 
enough and/or argue that it is going too far. In capitals such as Berlin and The Hague, many feel that the
Commission is acting too independently and wish for a more "technical Commission", expressing doubts about
whether a political Commission can be an objective "guardian of the Treaties". Among the smaller member
states there is an impression that the Commission has lost influence in the EU system and is thus no 
longer capable of defending their interests. However, if the Commission has lost influence, it is not necessarily
the Council who has gained it, as the Council formations have also lost power, as shown by the response 
to the refugee crisis where the main actors were the heads of state and government (European Council) 
and the Commission.
Germany is the country most often mentioned as having clearly increased its influence within the Commission.
However, the downsides of a more political Commission are also mentioned with respect to the increased
influence of other national capitals. It could, for example, also be seen in the "because it is France" comment
of President Juncker explaining the reason why France obtained extra leeway on deficits.33 If the Commission
is more political and less technocratic then also its technocratic decisions risk being seen through political
lenses and thus as less credible and nonpartisan. 
At the same time, the frequent inability of member states to agree to more than the smallest common
denominator as well as the complicated pieces of legislation mirroring the diversity of interests in the Council
are also deplored within the Commission. While many Commission officials understand that in the past the
institution was often insensitive to the impact of its own actions on the member states, several interviewees also
lamented the institution's loss of influence, while underscoring the need to engage more with the other EU
institutions, as well as with national parliaments.
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The member states are guarding their prerogatives, for example, by insisting that the double-hatted High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy, who is also one of the Vice-Presidents of the
Commission, does not speak for the Commission when addressing CFSP issues. Moreover, the increased practice
of the European Council, of which the Commission President is also a member, to include 'policy requests' to
the Commission in its conclusions waters down the Commission's monopoly on legislative initiative.34
If relations with the member states need to be improved, President Juncker's idea of sending the Commissioners
to the member states to transmit the messages of the Commission has not passed without criticism. Many
Commission staff members do not see their current Commissioners as the "preachers" or "evangelists of
European integration"35, but rather as less than Euro-enthusiastic.
To prepare the Commission's position to be taken in the interinstitutional process, the Deputy Heads of Cabinet
of the Commission participate in the Interinstitutional Relations Group (GRI Groupe des relations
interinstitutionnelles). Every point on the agenda is discussed based on a GRI fiche that is circulated beforehand
and on which the Vice-Presidents have the same control function. The secretariat of the GRI is provided by the
Secretariat-General. The GRI is one of the places where the negative aspects of the bureaucratic character of
the Commission become apparent, with one interviewee saying that the GRI is one of the strongest examples
undermining the Commission's claim that it is more political.36 The body is described as "very poorly run", with
many participants arriving late, and with a poor quality of exchange. There is also frustration regarding the
efficiency of the process, as many issues discussed in the GRI could be agreed through written procedure.
If there is room to improve relations with the member states, the fact that the president of the Commission has
emanated from the European Parliament elections through the Spitzenkandidaten process has somehow
improved relations with the Parliament. The Commission has developed a plan to further improve relations and
tries to develop a strategic alliance with the Parliament.37 At the same time, relations between the President and
the Parliament seemed to have cooled down after Jean-Claude Juncker berated MEPs for their poor attendance
at a speech of the Maltese prime minister.38 The Vice-Presidents represent the Commission in the European
Parliament, although the rule described in the Working Methods (according to which the VPs talk in the
plenaries and the regular Commissioners in the committees) is not always respected, the informal agreement
being that the Commission is represented by the Commissioners that can be present at a given moment.
Conclusions
Europe and the challenges it faces have greatly evolved in the past years. This has not only impacted national
politics but also the European institutions. The European Commission has been transformed into a more
political institution that is now more openly making political choices, although the transformation is far from
being complete and some flaws are still evident. 
The innovations introduced by the Juncker Commission have generally improved the functioning of the
Commission in terms of quality and coherence, and they have partially dealt with the institution's "inability to
prioritise".39 Dividing responsibilities among the Vice-Presidents has also made the delegation of tasks more
efficient, allowing for a better distribution of resources towards issues that need urgent solutions. The Juncker
Commission has also managed to act in a more coordinated fashion, and the use of project teams has
qualitatively improved the work of the Commission, its policy coherence and efficiency. The current setup with
more powerful Vice-Presidents also streamlined and brought more focus to the Commission, also adding a
stronger steer from above. 
At the same time, there are still many internal challenges. The higher level of centralisation of the system added
challenges regarding internal coordination, transparency and speed of the decisions taken, contributing to a
sense of disillusionment among the staff. To address the staff's demoralisation within the Commission, the
communication between the upper ranks of the Commission and the services clearly needs to improve. The
latter need to be engaged and used in the matters in which they are specialised. Communication between the
Commissioners and the higher echelons of the DGs also needs to improve, and the regular meetings that the
Commissioners have with the leadership of their services should become in all cases more than a formal ritual.
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To ensure a clearer and more timely delivery of result, the cabinets of Commissioners should also commit to
deadlines set internally.
The role and position of the Vice-Presidents has also not always been clear and this has affected the efficiency
of the institution. From this point of view, the Juncker Commission is likely to be a transitional one. The next
Commission should try to define more clearly the role of the Vice-Presidents, their powers and tools. 
The future Commission President should also focus on achieving a more even distribution of portfolios, one
that takes a serious look at the weights of the portfolios and distributes them more evenly. For this to happen,
the political ability and capabilities of the Commissioners also needs to further improve, while national leaders
should cease to see the Commission as a destination for politicians they do not want to have at the national
level. A better allocation of portfolios should also be accompanied by a better distribution of human resources
in the cabinets, but also within the Commission more generally. This could contribute to a better functioning
of the institution and reduce the human cost incurred by overworked staff. Improvements regarding the
management of human resources and a reassessment of the policy of a random rotation of the heads of units
across DGs should also be considered.
While the Juncker Commission has adopted a clearer set of priorities at the beginning of its mandate, these
priorities do not seem to have adapted fast enough to the rapidly changing realities. To perform and preserve a
necessary level of public support for the European project, the Commission must focus on issues that really
matter to the European citizens and where it can make a difference.
Commission President Juncker wants to maintain the more political character of the institution, by, among other
things, allowing Commissioners to participate in the next European elections without having to suspend
themselves from the Commission. The political character of a future Commission will also depend on the
maintenance of the link with the outcome of the European elections. Despite the fall of the de facto grand
coalition between the European People's Party and the Socialist and Democrats in the European Parliament, the
main parties should reach an agreement to keep the Spitzenkandidaten process before the next European
elections. Abandoning this connection would send the wrong message to the European citizens about the
representativeness and legitimacy of the European Commission. Being more political has also raised the issue
of the relation between the political and technocratic nature of the Commission. The reinforcement of the
political character of the Commission has also made more evident the more technocratic/regulatory parts of the
Commission's activities, thus also leading to more calls to make a clearer separation between the two.
In recent years, the member states have also been exerting greater influence on the EU institutional setup,
including inside the Commission. Although the Juncker Commission is active in the defence of its interest in
the interaction with the other EU institutions, there is room for further improvement on this issue, so that the
Commission does not become a mere secretariat for the member states.
Introducing change in a complex political and institutional organisation like the European Commission was
always going to be difficult. While it is evident that some of these challenges will also be faced by the next
Commission, it is encouraging to see that some of the hiccups and problems identified have started to be
addressed, and that the institution was functioning better in the second year of its mandate than it was in its first.
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